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The Will to Reason: Theodicy and Freedom in Descartes, by C. P. Ragland. Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. 272. $78.00 (hardcover).
EMILY KELAHAN, Illinois Wesleyan University
C. P. Ragland’s The Will to Reason is a nuanced and novel discussion of
two central issues in Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy: the scope
and nature of the skeptical doubts of the First Meditation and the nature
of human freedom in light of Descartes’ Fourth Meditation theodicy.
Ragland deftly engages rival interpretations of a variety of Cartesian doctrines, registering agreement and disagreement with precision. Overall,
his conclusions are carefully defended and richly supported by text. Despite the title, Descartes’ skeptical problems and his view of the nature of
human freedom sometimes seem only tenuously connected. However, by
the end, Ragland does connect the dots for his readers and enables them
to see why he believes these things are importantly related.
Chapter 1 is an analysis of the scope and nature of the skeptical worries
raised in the First Meditation. Descartes’ skepticism is often described as
methodological. He raises doubts about the reliability of both the senses
and reason in order to show that reason is superior to sensation and, when
used properly, yields reliable beliefs. In fact, many scholars believe this is
the project of the Meditations, establishing the authority of reason over the
senses and against skepticism. Ragland agrees with this big-picture view,
but stakes out less familiar ground on the type of skeptical worry with
which Descartes is concerned and how best to handle the Cartesian Circle.
He believes Descartes is primarily concerned with “consequent,” not
“antecedent,” skepticism, afflicting those who initially trust reason only
to discover that it is self-undermining in exactly the way highlighted by
the Cartesian Circle. Descartes needs God as a guarantor of his clear and
distinct perceptions, but reason suggests that he might have a defective
nature such that he errs systematically. This doubt is universal, applying
even to the truth rule and clear and distinct perceptions, and, in the case
of clear and distinct perceptions, indirect. Descartes cannot doubt clear
and distinct perceptions when he’s having them, but only retrospectively.
However, this retrospective doubt is what Descartes needs to remove with
the guarantee afforded by the existence of an omniperfect God.
Following some other interpreters, Ragland endorses a version of the
“two-level” solution to the Cartesian Circle wherein there are two types
of knowledge Descartes has at different crucial moments. He has cognitio, a lower level of knowledge of current clear and distinct perceptions,
when he begins to trace the circle, but he acquires scientia once he proves
God’s existence and the truth rule. This allows him to be certain of clear
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and distinct perceptions he’s had in the past even when he’s not perceiving them. Included in this stock is his perception of an omniperfect God,
which precludes the possibility of a deceptive nature. I’m not convinced
that this solves Descartes’ circularity problem, but I see that the payoff is
sizeable and credit Ragland for engaging deeply with several objections.
Illuminatingly, chapter 2 casts Descartes’ Fourth Meditation theodicy as
epistemological as much as theological. Far from an unnecessary interlude
in the Meditations, Ragland argues that Descartes’ theodicy is crucial to his
overall project of establishing the reliability of reason against skepticism.
God is the guarantor of his clear and distinct perceptions, but the fact that
he errs counts as rational evidence against the existence of an omniperfect
God. Thus, Descartes must show that error does not entail that an omniperfect God does not exist. To do this, Ragland argues that Descartes actually
responds to two different questions using two different strategies. First,
how is actual error compatible with God’s perfection? Ragland is satisfied
with the traditional free will defense as an answer. Secondly, why would
an omnipotent, perfectly benevolent God give humans freedom given that
it makes error possible? Ragland accepts the traditional answer here, too.
God has a morally sufficient reason for giving us the kind of freedom that
makes error possible, namely, that the universe is more perfect with humans possessing the kind of freedom that leads to error than it would be
if we did not. Distinguishing these questions is helpful, but invoking the
the principle of organic unities is fairly tried and true. However, Ragland’s
engagement with Michael Della Rocca on the related question of why God
would allow errors with respect to the senses but not with respect to clear
and distinct perceptions reminds one of why both of these philosophers are
so very worth reading. Ragland resolves the mystery posed by Descartes’
differential treatment of sense-based beliefs and clear and distinct perceptions by arguing that Descartes endorses a version of Kant’s “ought implies
can” principle. It’s not that Descartes assumes the truth of his clear and
distinct perceptions before the end of the Fourth Meditation, but rather
that he does not believe that God requires us to do what we cannot do,
namely, resist assent to clear and distinct perceptions. We can, however,
resist assent to obscure and confused perceptions, and should. One might
wonder whether this is a genuine normative principle capable of saving
reason from inconsistency. Ragland guards against this worry somewhat
by connecting it to a principle that is uncontroversially normative, “avoid
error,” but I worry that this move doesn’t have quite enough horsepower.
Despite my reservations, I will never teach or think about the Fourth Meditation in quite the same way having read this chapter.
Convinced that Descartes has shown that human error and the divine
guarantee are compossible and also that Descartes has a way of defending
reason against charges of inconsistency, chapters 3 and 4 seek to further
elucidate the murky notion of freedom that generated so much trouble
in the Fourth Meditation. Ragland argues that, to the surprise of many,
Descartes consistently endorses a version of the Principle of Alternative
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Possibilities (PAP), or the view that freedom requires being able to do otherwise than we actually do. To begin, Ragland stakes his position on how
best to understand Descartes’ puzzling, and only, definition of freedom:
[i] the will, or freedom of choice . . . simply consists in this: that we are able
to do or not do (that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid); [ii] or better
[vel potius], simply in this: that we are carried in such a way toward what
the intellect proposes for affirmation or denial or for pursuit or avoidance,
that we feel ourselves determined [determinari] to it by no external force. (AT
7:57/CSM 2:40; Ragland’s translation)

This definition is composed of two clauses, and it’s not clear how they
relate. The first clause says that freedom is a two-way power (to do or not
do). The second says that freedom is spontaneity (not being determined by
an external force). Does the second clause replace the first? Does it expand
on it? Ragland argues that it clarifies it. Two-way power and spontaneity
are “two sides of the same coin” and “any free act with one must also have
the other” (86). Ragland pores over the text of the Meditations to support
this reading of the definition and his claim that Descartes is committed to
the PAP. The latter is clear only once we acknowledge two different sorts
of two-way power: power in virtue of not being externally determined
and power in virtue of being motivationally indifferent. While Descartes
cannot be motivated otherwise when having a clear and distinct perception, he could have done otherwise in the sense that he is not externally
determined to assent to clear and distinct perceptions.
Chapter 4 advances textual support from outside the Meditations for
Ragland’s claim that Descartes is committed to a weak version of the PAP
(freedom requires the ability to do otherwise in the sense of not being externally determined). Particularly interesting is his discussion of the connection between Giebieuf and Descartes where he argues against Kenny
and Gilson in favor of the weak PAP view. By the close of the chapter,
Ragland has made Descartes’ uncomfortable positioning with respect to
freedom in the Fourth Meditation clear. He is, apparently, mired in an inconsistent quartet. Because Descartes treats the will and freedom of choice
as synonyms in his Fourth Meditation definition, he is committed to (1)
freedom is essential to the will (FEW). He is also, according to Ragland,
committed to (2) PAP. Together these entail that alternative possibilities
are essential to the will. Because Descartes believes that we cannot resist
assenting to clear and distinct perceptions, he is committed to (3) clear and
distinct determinism (CDD). However, because he believes that assent to
the cogito is voluntary, he is committed to (4) judgment is a voluntary act
(JVA). Together CDD and JVA entail that alternative possibilities are not
essential to the will. As Ragland observes, the conflict is really between
CDD and PAP, so one must reject Cartesian freedom as incoherent, reject
CDD, reject PAP, or rethink CDD or PAP such that they no longer conflict.
Ragland takes the last option with his two senses of two-way power, one
of which doesn’t deny CDD.
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Throughout chapters 3 and 4 I found myself resisting Ragland’s clever
two-two-way powers solution to the inconsistent quartet. It’s clear that
we are not motivationally indifferent when it comes to clear and distinct
perceptions, and so Ragland must argue that we are not externally determined. But what counts as “external”? As clear and distinct perceptions
ultimately come from God, it would seem that we lack freedom in both
senses of two-way power. Ragland goes to some lengths in addressing
these kinds of worries in chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5 advances a compatibilist reading of Descartes that hinges on a distinction between categorical
and hypothetical two-way power (we now have a two-two-two-waypowers solution). Categorical power is the ability to do otherwise in the
exact same circumstances. Hypothetical power is “counterfactual categorical ability” to do otherwise in “relevantly different circumstances” (131).
What differentiates the circumstances is what an agent decides to make
the object of her attention if she were to trace back time. It is true that
agents are determined by clear and distinct perceptions once attended to,
and so lack categorical freedom, but they might have initially directed
their attention elsewhere, so hypothetically they are free. Intellect does
determine the will in cases of clear and distinct perceptions, but it doesn’t
determine the will in all cases, so, in opposition to his previous view, Ragland maintains that Descartes is a compatibilist. I remain unconvinced that
this analysis fully addresses concerns about what’s external to the agent,
and I suspect that this kind of two-two-two-way freedom may strike some
as not being freedom at all. Chapter 6 details the ways in which Descartes
sees freedom as coming in degrees. While interesting, it fills out Cartesian
freedom as Ragland sees it without doing much to advance his claim that,
properly understood, freedom helps Descartes refute skepticism. Again,
freedom helps by being the fall guy for error in the Fourth Meditation,
which insulates God against the charge that divine nature might be such
that we cannot reasonably expect human nature to not be defective, allowing us to once again rule out defective nature doubt and to trust reason.
Chapter 7 returns to the connection between freedom and skepticism
about reason by way of an examination of how to reconcile divine providence with human freedom, but this time the news isn’t good for Descartes.
According to Ragland, this is where the Cartesian project really comes off
the rails. After contextualizing Descartes’ views on a variety of interconnecting doctrines, Ragland carefully explains that Descartes has a unique
perspective on providence and freedom that borrows some elements from
the Dominicans and some from the Jesuits. God creates the eternal truths
and all “conditional future contingents.” Because of this, God logically determines human action even if God does not causally determine human
action. As Ragland puts it, “creatures may not be puppets, but they certainly seem like robots, merely acting out a program that God wrote” (221).
Reason tells us both that we are free and that God logically determines
our actions—conflicting propositions—forcing us to question its reliability. As an attempt at reconciling this conflict (or perhaps just a surrender),
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Descartes concedes that we are rationally incapable of fully understanding
God’s power. Thus, a weakness in our reason is exposed and we cannot be
sure that God would not give us a defective nature.
Though hard to resist in the moment, one must, of course, question
whether Ragland’s interpretation of Descartes on human freedom is the
most accurate account of how Descartes actually conceived of it. If it is,
one must question whether it can carry the load Ragland thinks it can even
for the longer but ultimately short distance that it goes. At the very least,
Ragland shows that the Cartesian project of establishing the authority and
reliability of reason against skepticism might implode at a later juncture
than is commonly thought, and this is an important contribution. Insightful
and compellingly argued, The Will to Reason is a seminal work on Descartes’
view of human freedom and his skeptical crisis likely to challenge and delight scholars for years to come.

